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Five recent decisions reviewed in this 
article have highlighted the need for 
urgent reform of the procedure for fixing 
tariff periods for life prisoners. It is 
submitted that the judiciary should fix all 
life tariffs to avoid the criticism that 
Home Secretaries would be more 
susceptible than judges to influence by 
public clamour and pressure from the 
media.
YOUNG OFFENDERS
In R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Venables and Thompson 
[1997] 3 WLR 23, two boys who were 
ten years old at the time of the 
commission of the offence, were 
convicted of the murder of a two-year old 
boy, Jamie Bulger. They were sentenced 
to detention during Her Majesty's 
pleasure in accordance with s. 53(1) of 
the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. 
The trial judge recommended a tariff 
period of eight years, i.e. the minimum 
period during which it was necessary for 
them to be detained to satisfy the 
requirements of retribution and 
deterrence, taking into account their 
extreme youth. The Lord Chief Justice 
recommended that the tariff be increased 
to ten years, but the Secretary of State 
fixed the period at fifteen years in each 
case, having considered the judges' 
recommendations, petitions, correspondence 
and newspaper coupons expressing 
public opinion.
The boys applied for judicial review of 
the Secretary of State's decisions. The 
Divisional Court quashed the decisions 
and the Court or Appeal dismissed an
appeal by the Secretary of State and 
upheld the decision of the Divisional 
Court. On appeal to the House of Lords 
it was held, by a majority, that the 
sentences of detention during Her 
Majesty's pleasure were different in 
nature from mandatory life sentences 
imposed on adults; the Secretary of State 
was required to take into account the 
welfare of the children under s. 44(1) of 
the Children and Young Persons Act f 933 and 
to consider from time to time whether 
continued detention was justified. The 
inflexible policy of setting a minimum 
tariff at the outset which would, in no 
circumstances, be varied by reason of 
matters occurring subsequently to the 
offence, was unlawful. The Secretary of 
State had unlawfully exercised his 
discretion in taking into account public 
petitions and public opinion expressed in 
the media.
The court rejected the Secretary of 
State's policy of treating sentences of 
detention during Her Majesty's pleasure 
in the same manner as mandatory life 
sentences for adults. Section 53(1) 
provides for detention during Her 
Majesty's pleasure 'in lieu' of 
'imprisonment for life' where the 
offender appears to the court to have 
been under the age of eighteen years at 
the time of commission of the offence:
'A person convicted oj an offence who 
appears to the court to have been under the 
age oj eighteen years at the time the offence 
was committed shall not, if they are convicted 
of murder, be sentenced to imprisonment Jbr 
life ... but in lieu thereof the court shall 
(notwithstanding anything in this or any 
other Act) sentence them to be detained 
during Her Majesty's pleasure, and if so 
sentenced they shall be liable to be detained in 
such place and under such conditions as the 
Secretary of State may direct' (s. 53(1)).
The practical effect of the decision is 
that where a minor is sentenced to 
detention during Her Majesty's pleasure, 
the Secretary of State may adopt a tariff 
policy, but this must be sufficiently 
flexible to enable the Minister to take 
into account the development and 
progress of the minor.
In addition, the Secretary of State 
must not take into account the public 
clamour about the tariff. Lord Steyn 
observed as follows:
'Plainly a sentencing judge must ignore a 
newspaper campaign designed to encourage 
him to increase a particular sentence. It would 
be an abdication of the rule of law for a judge 
to take into account such matters. The same 
reasoning must apply to the Home Secretary 
when he is exercising a sentencing function. 
He ought to concentrate on the facts of the 
case and balance considerations oj public 
interest against the dictates of justice. Like a 
judge the Home Secretary ought not to be 
guided by a disposition to consult how popular 
a particular decision might he. He ought to 
ignore the high voltage atmosphere oj a 
newspaper campaign. The power given to him 
requires, above all, a detached approach. I 
would therefore hold that public protests about 
the level of a tariff to be fixed in a particular 
case are legally irrelevant and may not be 
taken into account by the Home Secretary in 
fixing the tariff. I conclude that the Home 
Secretary misdirected himself in giving weight 
to irrelevant considerations. It influenced his 
decisions. And it did so to the detriment of 
Venables and Thompson.'
Following this decision, the new Home 
Secretary announced, in November 
1997, new procedures for reviewing tariff 
periods fixed in relation to offenders 
sentenced to detention during Her 
Majesty's pleasure. He also stated that he 
would be fixing a new tariff in respect of 
the boys and confirmed that he would 
review their progress and the sentence at 
the halfway stage of the tariff.
In R v Secretary oj State jor the Home 
Department, ex parte Furber [1997] Crim 
LR 841, the applicant, aged seventeen 
years at the time of conviction, had 
pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the 
ground of diminished responsibility, for 
the killing of her great aunt. She was 
sentenced to detention for life under 
s. 53(2) of the Children and Young Persons 
Act 1933 and the trial judge 
recommended that she should serve a 
period of ten years to meet the 
requirements of retribution and 
deterrence. The Lord Chief Justice at
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that time recommended nine to ten years 
and the Secretary of State fixed the tariff 
period at nine years. The case was 
referred to the Lord Chief Justice's 
successor who recommended that the 
tariff be. fixed at seven years and the 
Secretary of State accepted that period.
The applicant applied for judicial 
review of the decision. It was submitted 
on her behalf that even if she were an 
adult, a seven-year tariff equated to a 
determinate sentence of 10'/2 to 14 years, 
which would have been too long. In theo
case of a young person, it was manifestly 
excessive. The Divisional Court, applying 
the House of Lords decision in ex pane 
Venables and Thompson, held that there 
should be regard to the welfare of the 
applicant in accordance with s. 44 (1) of 
the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, 
and that the correct approach in cases 
where the court sentenced a minor to 
detention for life was that the court 
should fix the minimum tariff, which 
should generally be half the appropriate 
determinate sentence. This would enable 
the Parole Board to consider the case 
sooner rather than later, in accordance 
with the provisions contained in s. 34 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1991. In this case 
the applicant had already served six years 
in detention, and a declaration was made 
that, had the Secretary of State directed 
himself in accordance with the law, as 
established by ex parte Venables and 
Thompson, he could not have properly 
certified a period exceeding that period 
which she had served in detention.
These cases are now subject to the 
provisions contained in s. 28 of the Crime 
(Sentences) Act 1997 by which the court is 
required to fix the tariff period as if 
acting under s. 34 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1991, by reducing the appropriate 
determinate sentence to half or two- 
thirds, and the Home Secretary is 
required to release offenders when 
directed to do so by the Parole Board.
MANDATORY LIFE 
PRISONERS
As regards adults sentenced to
O
mandatory life imprisonment, the House 
of Lords has recently considered the role 
of the Home Secretary in fixing the tariff 
period (R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Pierson [1997] 3 WLR 
492). In 1985 the applicant was 
convicted of the murders of his parents. 
He was 20 years old at the time of the 
offences and had lived with his parents at 
the family home, a small farmhouse in
Wales. He had no previous convictions 
and was described as of 'positively good 
character'. His parents were shot more 
than once at close range with a shotgun, 
in the middle of the night, while at least 
one of them was asleep. The applicant 
called the police and admitted the 
offences. At his trial he stated that he 
could not recollect the events, and no 
motive for the murders could be found.
The trial judge sentenced the applicant 
to the mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment in accordance with s. 1(2) 
of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) 
Act 1965. The section provides as follows:
'On sentencing any person convicted of 
murder to imprisonment for life, the court may 
at the same time declare the period which it 
recommends to the Secretary1 of State as the 
minimum period which in it's view should 
elapse before the Secretary of State orders the 
release of that person on licence...'
The judge recommended to the) o
Secretary or State that the applicant 
should serve a tariff period of 15 years' 
imprisonment, and this was agreed by the 
Lord Chief Justice. In 1988, however, the 
Secretary of State fixed the tariff at 20 
vears and, in accordance with the 
practice then, the applicant was not 
informed of this. He was one of the 
successful applicants in the decision of 
the House of Lords in R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex parte Doody 
[1994] 1 AC 531, which held that 
mandatory lifers were entitled to be 
informed of the tariff and the reasons for 
the decision to fix the tariff.
Following that decision, the Homeo
Office altered its practice, and the 
applicant was sent a letter outlining the 
judicial recommendations and stating 
that the period of 15 years would have 
been appropriate for a single premeditated 
offence, but because a double murder 
had been committed, the period of 20 
years had been fixed by the Secretary of 
State. The applicant made representations 
to the Secretary of State, but the Home 
Office wrote to his solicitors to say that 
although it was accepted that it would 
have been wrong to have proceeded on 
the basis that the murders were 
premeditated, and that it was further 
accepted that they were part of a single 
incident, the Secretary of State at that 
time came to the conclusion that a tariff 
of 20 years was appropriate to meet the 
requirements of retribution and 
deterrence.
The applicant sought judicial review of
the Secretary of State's decision. The 
Divisional Court quashed the decision 
and the Court of Appeal allowed the 
Secretary of State's appeal. On appeal by 
the applicant to the House of Lords it 
was held by a majority, allowing the 
appeal, that the Secretary of State's 
decision was unlawful and should be 
quashed, as he had effectively increased 
the tariff in deciding to retain the term of 
20 years, notwithstanding the fact that he 
had accepted that it was wrong to 
proceed on the basis that the murders 
were premeditated.
The court stated that once the tariff 
was fixed by the Secretary of State and 
communicated, there was no general 
power to increase it in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances, as that would 
be in breach of the principle that a lawful 
sentence should not be increased 
retrospectively. Furthermore, the 
Secretary of State must observe normal 
constraint in making decisions on 
punishment.
REFORM OF FILING OF 
MANDATORY LIFE TARIFFS
The current procedure for the fixing of 
the tariff for mandatory lifers is 
contained in s. 29 of the Crime (Sentences) 
Act 1997. The section was brought into 
force on 1 October 1997 and provides as 
follows:
'(I) If recommended to do so by the Parole 
Board, the Secretary of State may, after 
consultation with the Lord Chief Justice to 
enter with the trial judge if available, release 
on licence a life prisoner who is not one to 
whom s. 28 above applies [s. 28 relates to 
discretionary life prisoners, automatic life 
prisoners under s. 2, and minors sentenced to 
detention during Her Majesty's pleasure].
(2) The Parole Board shall not make a 
recommendation under subs. (I) above unless 
the Secretary of State has referred the 
particular case, or the class of case to which 
that case belongs, to the Board for its advice.'
It was held by the Court of Appeal in 
R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex p Stafford, The Times 28 
November 1997, that s. 29 of the 1997 
Act conferred on the Home Secretary an 
extraordinarily wide discretion to refuse 
to direct the release of a mandatory life 
prisoner following recommendation by 
the Parole Board as to release. Lord 
Bingham CJ, delivering the judgment did, 
however, express the view that the 
imposition of what was in effect a 
substantial term of imprisonment by the
exercise or executive discretion, without 
trial, lay uneasily with ordinary concepts 
of the rule of law. It was further held by 
the Divisional Court in R v Secretary of 
State Jor the Home Department, ex parte 
Hindley, The Times 19 December 1997, 
that in exercising his broad discretion 
confirmed by s. 29, the Home Secretary 
was entitled to fix a whole life tariff to be 
served by Myra Hindley, a mandatory life 
prisoner, even though an earlier Home 
Secretary had considered a provisional 
tariff of 30 years, as that period had 
neither been fixed nor communicated to 
the prisoner. The court considered that 
the present Home Secretary's policy, 
announced in November 1997, in taking 
into account issues such as the prisoner's 
exceptional progress in custody, was 
commendable. Lord Bingham CJ, 
delivering the judgment did, however, 
state that there was room for serious
debate as to whether the task of fixing the 
tariff should be undertaken by the 
judiciary, as in the case of discretionary 
life prisoners, or as at present by the 
executive, for Myra Hindley had clearly 
felt that she was held hostage to public- 
opinion, although no longer judged a 
danger to anyone, because of her 
notoriety and the public obloquy which 
would befall any Home Secretary who 
ordered her release.
It is submitted that early reform of the 
procedure ought to be introduced to 
bring it in line with the procedure under 
s. 28 of the 1997 Act which applies to 
discretionary lifers, automatic lifers and 
those sentenced to detention during Her 
Majesty's pleasure. The result would be a 
clear and uniform procedure applied to 
all cases of life imprisonment, in which 
the judiciary would set the tariff, i.e. the 
relevant part of the sentence which the
prisoner would have to serve before 
being considered for release on licence by
o J
a Lifer Panel of the Parole Board, 
presided over by a senior judge. It would 
avoid the criticism levelled at Secretaries 
of State that they would be more 
susceptible than judges to be influenced 
by public clamour and pressure from the 
media when deciding on matter of 
punishment, and would also properly 
leave all decisions relating to punishment 
to the judiciary. @
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Commercial Law
Confidentiality letters   protecting disclosed business secrets
It was reported in the business press, 
that when Barclays Bank pic put their 
investment banking arm up for sale, a 
number of potential purchasers were 
concerned about the severity of the 
restrictions in the confidentiality 
agreement they were presented with. The 
sale process will have involved Barclays 
providing confidential information about 
their investment banking arm to the 
potential purchasers. Barclays will have 
been concerned that potential purchasers 
may have been tempted to use the 
confidential information for their own 
commercial purposes, rather than simply 
for the purpose of evaluating the 
acquisition, or that they may simply have
by Nigel Thorne
been careless as to whom thev ?ave access
J O
to the confidential information.
When a business is up for sale and 
confidential information is given out, 
there may be a concern that companies 
who have expressed an interest in 
acquiring the business are on a fact- 
finding exercise, with no intention of 
undertaking an acquisition. This suspicion 
will be particularly strong where the 
potential acquirer is a competitor. Even if 
a competitor has a genuine interest in the 
acquisition they may not turn out to be the 
successful acquirer. A vendor who fails to 
sell their business or the actual acquirer of 
the business will be concerned as to who 
has obtained confidential information 
during the sales process and, if they are a 
competitor, what they could do with it.
As a result it is normal for a potential 
purchaser to be asked to enter into a 
confidentiality agreement before they are 
provided with sensitive information. 
However, placing legal obligations on a 
potential purchaser is not necessarily the 
whole answer in practical terms. A vendor 
may not know that confidential 
information is being used or distributed
o
for purposes unconnected with the sale. 
Lven if they suspect that it is being used 
for commercial advantage it may be
o J
difficult to prove. Therefore a vendor 
should consider holding back the most 
confidential information about their 
business, such as customer lists, until the 
sales contract is about to be signed.
DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Depending on the circumstances there 
may be common law duties of 
confidentiality. The type of information 
involved and the relationship between the 
parties at the time of disclosure will be the 
key factors. There would seem to be little 
doubt that business information 
concerning corporate strategy, customer 
lists and pricing will, if not in the public 
domain, give rise to a duty of confidence if 
handed to a third party as part of a sales 
process. However, common law duties will 
rarely be relied on, essentially for three 
reasons:
  a document setting out the type of 
information that is confidential and the 
duty of confidence in relation to that 
information will serve to emphasise the 
existence of the duty and the 
importance that the vendor places on it;
  if the duty of confidence is thought to 
have been breached, a provider will have 
greater confidence approaching a court 
for an injunction or other relief or 
remedy, if they are armed with an 
agreement between the parties which
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